The situation in New Caledonia
On May 14th, 2024, the French Assemblée Nationale adopted in first-reading a constitutional reform bill modifying New Caledonia’s local elections’ electoral college. Soon after, the declaration of the State representative in New Caledonia stating that the territory is “on the verge of a civil war” showed how dire the situation really is.
In response, the French President gave to both the Kanak independentists and the opponents of independence – usually referred to as “loyalists” – thirty days to find an agreement on the reform. All of this without publicly calling into question the parliamentary agenda, which calls for the Congress to meet by the end of June to give the final approval to the reform. Simultaneously, the Government and the Loyalists are making a prerequisite of a return to Republican order before resuming any talks. The Government ostensibly communicated around the arrival of reinforcements – mainly from the Gendarmerie – and launched a major operation to remove roadblocks. If it is likely that the Government will succeed in doing so, it will most probably only reinforce the hostility and resentment of the independentists and therefore further ruin the trust patiently built up after the 1984-1988 insurrections around the Matignon agreements in 1988 and reinforced by the Nouméa agreement of 1998.
Without entering the meanderings of an extremely complex case, one shall recall that New Caledonia’s situation is a singular one. It is on the United Nations list of “non-self-governing territories”, but the native Kanak population for whom this right to independence is recognized are a minority on the island, representing only 40% of the population. The vast majority of the 60% left are descendants of colonial settlers who have been there for over 100 years. A steady flow of immigration over the past few decades having helped to reinforce this imbalance. In this context, the achievement of the Matignon and Nouméa agreements is to have established the principle that progress towards independence could only come from a ballot opened to both communities. This was far from being simple in the light of what had happened in the world since 1945, for instance in Algeria. It is therefore up to both communities to define a project for the island – and to implement it within the framework of the very specific institutions that have been designed to allow Independentists to have executive responsibilities. All of this with the benevolent and conciliatory help of the French State, whose neutrality towards both Kanaks and Loyalists is both the condition and the keystone for the success of this process of “a negotiated decolonization” – which is not necessarily synonymous with independence.
The Nouméa agreements had planned, after a twenty-year transitional period, the holding of three referendums in order to enable the population to decide whether or not leave the French Republic. The first two consultations from 2018 and 2020 have resulted in a rejection of total independence. The third one, held in 2021, was stricken with a boycott from the independentists as well as a 56,1% abstention rate. This deprived the overwhelming majority in favor of the status quo (representing over 90% of voters) of all political and symbolic credibility, which brought the process of a negotiated and consensual evolution to a standstill. It was therefore necessary to resume discussions in order to open up new horizons, which the Government set out to do in the summer of 2022. It then came up against a problem, which seems secondary in the true sense of the term but is actually essential: the electoral college for local elections.
Given the demographic imbalance, the question of who is to vote in these elections is a major challenge: it determines the Independentists’ ability to control and manage territorial institutions and to play a role in the island’s evolution and economic and social development. There are three different electoral colleges in New Caledonia: one for statutory referendums, one for local elections, and one for the other remaining elections. For the local elections, the original principle was a “sliding college” from the 1988 college onwards, opened to new residents ten years after their arrival as well as to new natives. In 2007, the French President Jacques Chirac decided to block the college and made a commitment on behalf of the State that it would remain permanently closed, which posed an undeniable constitutional problem. Meanwhile, the Government simultaneously led substantive discussions on the matter as well as negotiations on this second issue, as it was required to both organize the territorial elections and avoid legal challenges. Believing that the Independentists were playing the long game, the Government seized the Parliament on this electoral issue. First with an organic law aiming to postpone the elections, which was voted without difficulty. Then with a constitutional bill reintroducing the former “sliding electoral college”. It is the adoption of this second text which triggered the protests and violence.
The Independentists believe that any change in the electoral college should be discussed at the same time as the evolution of the draft statutory agreement. The electoral college reform is demanded by Government and the Loyalists: blocking it is therefore a new card to play for the Independentists in the statutory agreement negotiations, which they are the only one to desire. This refusal to dissociate the two issues also reflects a loss of confidence in the Government. Emmanuel Macron’s decision to maintain the third referendum in 2021, the appointment of the President of the South Province to the Government in 2022 while she kept her territorial functions and thus participated as a Loyalist representative to the negotiations, the very “strong” and closed speech of the President in September 2023, the appointment of a New Caledonian deputy hostile to independence as rapporteur for the constitutional bill: so many events that ended up persuading the Independentists that the executive had definitely sided with the Loyalists, in a context of one-upmanship among the latter due to rivalries between the Republicans, the Centrists and the Rassemblement National representatives. One can also add that there have been seven ministers in charge of the issue since 2017 and that, no matter what Gérald Darmanin’s political skills are, entrusting the dual responsibility of negotiation and law enforcement to the same minister is not a signal of openness for pro-independence leaders – which were accustomed to directly deal with the Prime Minister since the Michel Rocard days. Even if the law enforcement operations manage to bring back calm over the next few days, only the announcement of a deferral of the Versailles Congress and the resumption of comprehensive negotiations could plant the seeds of trust, which is essential to avoid a return to the pre-1988 situation. Or worse, to take the risk of falling into civil war, as the State representative fears.
Eric Giuily
President of CLAI
Former General Director of Local Authorities at the ministry of the Interior and Decentralization (1982 -1986)